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"Theoretical Diversity in International Relations: Dominance, Pluralism, and Division" published on by Oxford University Press.

1. Introduction: Is International Relations an American dominated discipline? 1. - 2. American dominance as agenda setting? 23. - 3. American theoretical dominance? 48. - 4. American epistemological and methodological dominance? 73. - 5. American institutional dominance? 93. - 6. American dominance as gate-Keeping? 117 . - 7. Conclusion: diversity and dominance in International Relations 140

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Dedication Page -- Abbreviations -- Preface -- Preface to the second edition -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Theoretical considerations -- 3 The rise of medicine: the pre-scientific era -- 4 Technical and political process in the rise of scientific medicine -- 5 The subordination of midwifery -- 6 The limitation of optometry -- 7 The exclusion of chiropractic -- 8 Conclusion -- Postscript: the politics of medical dominance -- Methodological appendix -- Bibliography -- Index.

We establish mathematical equivalence between independence of irrelevant alternatives and monotonicity with respect to first order stochastic dominance. This formal equivalence result between the two principles is obtained under two key conditions. Firstly, for all natural numbers m, each principle is defined on the domain of compound lotteries with compoundness level m. Secondly, the standard concept of reduction of compound lotteries applies.

La thèse marxiste de la détermination de l'économique est examinée sous deux angles: en tant qu'énonce d'une position philosophique de type matérialiste dans le domaine socio‐culturel, et en tant qu'idée directrice théorique et méthodologique. Sous cet angle particulier, le texte se propose d'élucider la question de la forme de cette détermination d'abord, de sa définition ensuite. Le texte explore la signification et la portée d'une définition de la détermination de l'économique comme détermination de la forme dominante dans le processus d'appropriation du surproduit social. Une typologie de sociétés en découle qui traverse aussi le cadre conceptuel d'une bonne partie de la discipline sociologique. Le texte examine le fonctionnement d'une de ces typologies afin de repérer le point nodal où la théorie marxiste se sépare radicalement de ces constructions sociologiques.In this paper we argue that the Marxist economic determination thesis is both a materialist philosophical statement of the socio‐cultural field and a theoretical‐methodological guiding principle. In developing this interpretation we examine the form and significance of the economic determination as determination of the dominant form in the process of appropriation of the social product. From this we derive a typology of societies that cuts across the conceptual framework of a large part of the sociological discipline. We then examine the functioning of one of these typologies in order to locate the radical point of departure of Marxist theory from such sociological constructions.

We examine the spread of a disease or behavior through a social network. In particular, we analyze how infection rates depend on the distribution of degrees (numbers of links) among the nodes in the network. We introduce new techniques using first- and second order stochastic dominance relationships of the degree distribution in order to compare infection rates across different social networks.

Introduction/purpose: Chemical structures are conveniently represented by graphs where atoms are nodes (vertices) and chemical bonds are branches (lines) in the graph. A graphical representation of a molecule provides a lot of useful information about the chemical properties of the molecule. It is known that numerous physical and chemical properties of molecules are highly correlated with theoretical invariants of graphs, which we call topological indices. One such theoretical invariant is the dominance number. The aim of this research is to determine the k-dominance number for cyclooctane chains 𝐶𝑂𝐶𝑛 1 , 𝐶𝑂𝐶𝑛 2 , 𝐶𝑂𝐶𝑛 3 and 𝐶𝑂𝐶𝑛 4 , for k ∈ {1,2,3}, n ∈ 𝑁. Methods: The cyclooctane chain is a chain of octagons connected by a single line. The vertices of the octagon are treated as nodes of the graph, and the sides and the line connecting them, as branches in the graph. Using mathematical methods, k-dominance was determined on one octagon, k∈{1,2,3}. Then, by representing the cyclooctane chains 𝐶𝑂𝐶𝑛 1 , 𝐶𝑂𝐶𝑛 2 , 𝐶𝑂𝐶𝑛 3 and 𝐶𝑂𝐶𝑛 4 , in a convenient, isomorphic way, we determined their k-dominance number, k∈{ 1,2,3}. Results: Determining k-dominance, k∈{1,2,3}, for 4 cyclooctane chains 𝐶𝑂𝐶𝑛 1 , 𝐶𝑂𝐶𝑛 2 , 𝐶𝑂𝐶𝑛 3 and 𝐶𝑂𝐶𝑛 4 , we obtained 12 different formulas to calculate their k-dominance number. All formulas are composed of several alternative algebraic expressions, the selection of which is conditioned by the divisibility of the number n by the number 2, 3 or 4, depending on the type of cyclooctane chain and k-dominance to be determined. The results of the research are fully presented in the paper through mathematically proven theorems and graphical representations. Conclusion: The results show that the k-dominance numbers, k∈{1,2,3}, on cyclooctane chains 𝐶𝑂𝐶𝑛 1 , 𝐶𝑂𝐶𝑛 2 , 𝐶𝑂𝐶𝑛 3 and 𝐶𝑂𝐶𝑛 4 , are determined and explicitly expressed by mathematical expressions. They also indicate the possibility of their application in molecular graphs of cyclooctane rings, in computational chemistry, chemical and biological industry.

This paper discusses the role of electoral institutional design in Mexico's transition to democracy. Our argument is that electoral rules facilitated party dominance through two mechanisms: electoral rules disproportionately rewarded existing majorities and, at the same time, discouraged potential majorities from forming. More specifically, the rules rewarded parties that could win a majority of the vote in single-member districts; but at the same time, rewarded minority parties with seats from multi-member districts, mitigating Duvergerian incentives to coordinate behind a single challenger. In the short run, seats from multi-member districts benefited opposition parties by significantly reducing entry costs; in the long run, however, these seats helped sustain party dominance, by discouraging coordination among opposition parties and voters.